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Causes of Unionization 
in Canadian Banks 
Graham S. Lowe 
This paper investigates the origins and development of 
unions in the Canadian banking industry since 1976. The histori-
cally low level of unionization in banking, coupled with its largely 
female workforce, makes bank unionization a significant devel-
opment on the Canadian industrial relations scène. 
Canada's banks are among the most powerfull and conservative éco-
nomie institutions in the country. Thèse industry characteristics hâve been 
reflected in employée — management relations, which traditionally hâve 
been dominated by managerial paternalism and an ideology of individual-
ism. Consequently, banks until recently hâve been virtually union-free. This 
established pattern of industrial relations began to change in the summer of 
1976. Female employées in two branches of the Canadian Impérial Bank of 
Commerce, one in British Columbia and the other in Ontario, sought union 
représentation. Thèse two unrelated incidents launched a major union 
organizational campaign in the bank industry. By December 1980 unions 
represented employées in 76 chartered bank branches across Canada, there-
by gaining a foothold in the industry1. 
Bank unionization is one of the most significant developments on the 
Canadian industrial relations scène in over a décade. Not since the introduc-
tion of the Public Service Staff Relations Act in 1967 has the potential to 
organize such a large number of employées in a single industry been so 
great. Bank employées are the last group falling under fédéral labour légis-
lation to bargain collectively. Equally noteworthy is that the organizational 
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campaign was initiated by women, thought to hâve a lower union propen-
sity than men2, in an industry with one of the lowest unionization rates in 
Canada (CALURA, 1979:72). 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the factors underlying the 
émergence of bank unions. The first section of the paper will offer theoreti-
cal perspectives on the unionization processes helpful for interpreting récent 
developments in banking. While it is not our intention to présent and test a 
gênerai theory of unionization, bank unionization does provide an oppor-
tunity to explore three theoretical questions which hâve received insufficient 
attention in the industrial relations literature: 1) Why do individual workers 
join unions?; 2) What factors in the workplace, the workers' backgrounds 
and the larger environment facilitate the transition from individual to col-
lective action within a work group?; and 3) What factors inhibit employées 
from unionizing? Guided by our discussion of thèse questions, the second 
section of the paper will examine bank unionization in terms of the under-
lying causes, precipitating issues and obstacles faced by employées. Evi-
dence will be drawn mainly from 57 intensive interviews conducted by the 
author with members of the Canadian Labour Congress' Union of Bank 
Employées (UBE), organizers from a number of bank unions and senior 
bank personnel officiais. The paper will conclude by suggesting a number of 
useful hypothèses for future research. 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Despite a climate of employée relations in banks which has discouraged 
unionism, the historical record does reveal several unsuccessful attempts to 
establish unions prior to 1976. For example, in 1919 the American Fédéra-
tion of Labour set up the Bank Employées' Association to spearhead a ma-
jor organizing campaign in banks on both sides of the border3. While sever-
al hundred bank employées joined the gênerai swell of labour protest after 
World War I, they were thwarted by the banks' refusais to deal with the 
union4. That bank employées themselves had internalized the ethic of indi-
2 In 1977, 26.8% of the women, compared to 41.1% of the men, in the Canadian 
labour force were union members (Canada, 1980:11). 
3 See The Monetary Times, 26 December 1919, p. 9, and 16 January 1920, p. 7 for brief 
accounts of this organizing drive. Interviews conducted by the author with several retired maie 
clerks employed in Canadian banks at the end of World War I hâve confirmed the existence of 
this brief attempt at unionization. 
4 Similar post-World War I bank unionization campaigns in Australia, Sweden, 
Germany and Britain laid the foundations for powerful national bank unions. See the histori-
cal accounts in STURMTHAL (1966), BLACKBURN (1967), ALLEN and WILLIAMS (1960) 
and ADAMS (1974). 
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vidualism was also a powerful impediment to collective action, as the fol-
lowing account of a Bank Employées' Association meeting in 1920 reveals: 
" 'We cannot ail be bank présidents/ was a statement at the Toronto meet-
ing. Quite true, but by adopting the labour basis of wage will we not put a 
premium on slothfulness and kill individual initiative, energy and inhérent 
ability? Our own gênerai manager started as a junior clerk... indeed ail our 
executive officers started at the lowest rung of the ladder — and only by the 
exercise of personal initiative hâve they attained their présent position."5 
Union activity once again surfaced during the Second World War. The 
Canadian Congress of Labour's Office and Professional Workers' Organiz^ 
ing Committee (OPWOC) signed up a total of 840 bank workers mainly in 
Toronto, Montréal and Ottawa during 1941-19426. Wartime inflation had 
sparked widespread unrest over salaries and the union thought the prevail-
ing industrial relations environment would be conducive to new white-collar 
organizing drives. The OPWOC s greatest gains were among the franco-
phone maie staff of the Banque Canadienne Nationale in Montréal7. Man-
agement retaliated with what the union described as "a vicious campaign of 
intimidation and misrepresentation". Thèse tactics ultimately precipitated 
Canada's first bank strike, the failure of which brought the démise of the 
OPWOC. 
The labour movement's reluctance to mount another bank organizing 
campaign was reinforced in 1959 when the Kitimat, Terrace and District 
General Workers' Union in Kitimat, British Columbia, applied to the 
Canada Labour Relations Board (CLRB) to represent three employées at 
the town's Bank of Nova Scotia branch. The board ruled that a branch was 
not an appropriate bargaining unit (see Canadian Labour Law Reports, 
1959:1797). This légal précèdent thus discouraged union activity in the in-
dustry for over two décades by virtue of the massive organizational efforts 
required to create régional, provincial or national bargaining units. 
5 The Monetary Times, 16 January 1920, p. 7. 
6 Détails of the OPWOC campaign arcfound in the Public Archives of Canada, MG 
28,1 103, vol. 92 ("General File on Office and Professional Workers Organizing Committee", 
and "File: OPWOC, Banque Canadienne Nationale Strike"). 
7 It was well known that BCN employées were the lowest paid bank employées in 
Montréal. The starting salary was $416.00 annually, with the average teller earning $913 an-
nually after nine years. In contrast the average annual clérical salary in Canada in 1941 was 
$922 (MELTZ, 1969:241). Employées also complained of having to work long hours of over-
time with no pay. The centrality of the wage issue in this OPWOC campaign is noteworthy, 
given the more secondary rôle wages play in the current unionization drive, as we will see 
below. 
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There is, however, one important exception in this legacy of failures. In 
1967 an affiliate of the Office and Professional Employées International 
Union became the bargaining agent for approximately 1,100 employées of 
the Montréal, City and District Savings Bank in the Montréal area. The 
union originated through the failure of a staff association, run by maie ac-
countants, to extract salary increases from the bank. This is the only Cana-
dian example of the staff association route to unionization, something 
much more prévalent in British banking. Furthermore, because the employ-
er is a small, local savings bank it is difficult to draw direct comparisons 
with the présent unionization drive in the major chartered banks. 
THEORETICAL ISSUES IN THE UNIONIZATION PROCESS 
It is useful to begin our discussion of the unionization process by ask-
ing why workers join unions. Given that taking out union membership is es-
sentially a social act, it is important to know what conditions encourage a 
collective response by workers to the employer's authority. Worker re-
sponses to managerial power and job problems may be placed on a con-
tinuum, ranging from individual passivity and acquiescence — characteriz-
ed by apathy or quitting — to militant collective action (see Fox, 
1971:80-83). Our concern hère is with those factors which facilitate or inhib-
it this transition from individual adaptation to collective résistance. 
Most discussions of unionization take for granted the question of ori-
gins, focusing instead on patterns of growth8. Furthermore, when the 
causes of unionization are examined the primary concern is often with the 
immédiate issues involved. What émerges is an explanation based on ideo-
syncratic causes spécifie to each case. There is little attempt to theoretically 
interpret the underlying conflicts and social processes involved. 
We will attempt, in a preliminary manner, to address this problem by 
focusing on four issues central to the émergence of unionization. We will 
first examine the concept of employée powerlessness, emphasizing its im-
portance for understanding the development of unionization. Because 
worker subordination to management is especially pronounced in the case 
of female clérical workers, this discussion will provide a useful background 
to our examination of bank unions. We will then consider the rôle of 
bureaucracy in unionization. Bureaucratization of the workplace has been 
widely identified as the most prominent organizational factor in white-
8 This especially applies to studies of white-collar unions, as exemplified in the work of 
BAIN (1970). 
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collar union growth. Third, we will explore how work group dynamics, 
family and friendship ties and the larger community context contribute to 
the émergence of unions. Thèse sociological factors do not receive adéquate 
attention in the industrial relations literature, despite their central rôle in 
unionization. Fourth, we will investigate how management opposition to 
collective bargaining constitutes a major obstacle to unionization. 
Employée Powerlessness 
Underlying workers' complaints about wages and working conditions 
is a basic fact of industrial life: their relative powerlessness vis-à-vis man-
agement. The idea that greater worker control over jobs constitutes a driv-
ing force in unionization can be traced back to the early théories of the 
labour movement. The Webbs (1894; 1911) interpret workers' pursuit of 
économie gain as expressing a désire to reduce employer domination. 
Unions thus provide a means of curbing the employées power by establish-
ing rules and régulations which govern working conditions. Perlman (1928) 
similarly stresses the job control functions of unions. He consider improve-
ments in wages and working conditions to be less important than instituting 
formai controls designed to safeguard the maximum number of jobs. 
Contemporary industrial relations theory élaborâtes thèse thèmes by 
focusing on Systems of job régulation (see Bain and Clegg, 1974). This per-
spective assumes that job régulation through union contracts establishes a 
web of rules which help establish greater workplace stability (Dunlop, 
1971). A critical alternative to the job régulation model defines industrial 
relations as the process of control over work. This underlines the centrality 
of inequality, power and conflict in the workplace (see Hyman, 1975). The 
traditional conception of employée powerlessness is modified to show how 
workers continually resist subordination by management through a variety 
of formai and informai tactics. 
Empirical studies of why workers join unions also focus on power 
struggles between employers and employées for control over the conditions 
of work. For as Bakke (1956:34) argues, a common goal among workers is 
"to gain an increasing measure of independence in and control over their 
own affairs". Unions contribute to this by restricting managerial discrétion 
through collective bargaining, a mechanism consistent with the institutional 
basis of management power. 
Karsh's (1958) study of a strike over union récognition at a U.S. paper 
mill is instructive in this respect. He goes beyond the immédiate issues of the 
unionization campaign, suggesting that employée dissatisfaction is rooted 
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in the authority System of the plant. Workers are expected to obey employ-
ées commands, yet both parties hold only vague notions of how much obé-
dience can be expected. Conflicting views arise over what constitutes a fair 
day's work and a fair day's pay, thereby creating worker discontent. Unions 
provide the worker with a means of limiting employer expectations regard-
ing his rights and obligations. Collective bargaining is thus "the very 
method by which workers may achieve a measure of control and exercise it 
jointly with management" (Karsh, 1958:10). 
The worker's expérience of hierarchical work organization is often 
manifested in feelings of job insecurity. For example, Vaid (196:5:214-215) 
concludes that the major reason why a group of textile workers took out 
union membership was to obtain better work rules that would protect job 
security and prevent victimization by management. Despite arguments that 
greater job security is a strong motivation to unionize (Crispo, 1978:131; 
Goodfellow, 1973), it is essential to explore the larger organizational con-
text in which feelings of insecurity arise. We thus find the workers in Vaid's 
(1965) study defining job security in terms of protection from arbitrary dis-
missal, a manifestation of their subordination within the factory hierarchy. 
Job security can be more broadly interpreted as protection against arbitrary 
management action, especially when one considers the relative powerless-
ness of low-ranking employées to affect work décisions. This helps us to see 
that lying behind expressions of job insecurity "is the anxious fear of stand-
ing alone and defenseless against économie powers stronger than oneself" 
(VandeVall, 1970:131). 
This argument appears to contradict the image of the worker as an 
économie man driven by the quest for material gain. But there is little con-
sensus in the literature about the influence of wage levels on unionization. 
On one hand, empirical studies (Seidman et al., 1951; Bakke, 1956; Karsh, 
1958; Vaid, 1965; Van de Vall, 1970) do not identify wages as the primary 
cause of unionization9. This is not to deny that workers are genuinely con-
cerned about wages. Rather, it is to recognize that low wages alone rarely 
cause unionization (Barbash, 1956:10). On the other hand, some analysts 
place low wages at the top of the list of grievances in a union campaign 
(Sayles and Strauss, 1966:114-115), especially when white-collar workers 
are involved (Stanton, 1972, Shaw, 1960; O'Connor and Colernan, 1973; 
Blum et al., 1971; Mills, 1956). C. Wright Mills (1956:309) aptly summa-
rizes this view when he states that "the main connection between union and 
9 We should note that KARSH (1958) found that the predominantly female work force 
in the paper mill he studied was deeply concerned over low wages and pièce-work priées. How-
ever, he argues that thèse grievances are part of the more fundamental problem of the workers' 
inability to détermine working conditions. 
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invidivual member is the fatter pay check". But this rests on the question-
able assumption that white-collar workers are generally less class conscious 
and more management-oriented and individualistic than blue-collar work-
ers (cf. Bain et al., 1973). 
The wage question can be partly clarified by examining the organiza-
tional and environmental contexts in which wage claims are made. For in-
stance, lying behind the salary grievances of unionizing bank clerks in 
Britain and Sweden in the post-World War I period were the more basic 
issues of increasing bureaucratization and declining clérical status — both 
of which were manifested in declining relative wages (see Adams, 1974; 
Allen and Williams, 1960; Blackburn, 1967). Furthermore, Bain's model of 
the déterminants of white-collar union growth does not include wages as 
one of its stratégie variables (Bain, 1970). Wage demands may also serve as 
a rallying point for less tangible grievances arising from the employées' 
subordination to management or the intrinsically unrewarding nature of 
their jobs. This is supported by the Webb's argument that a désire to curb 
employer domination underpins wage demands. Wages are certainly the 
most concrète and visible aspect of collective agreements, but more essen-
tially they constitute a challenge to the employer's unilatéral right to estab-
lish working conditions. 
The great paradox regarding unionization is that many workers with 
the poorest working conditions and least bargaining power remain unorgan-
ized. This is especially true in the case of female clérical workers, where one 
might expect their powerlessness and subordination to provide fertile 
ground for union organization (Marchak, 1974:197). Clérical work is now 
the largest occupational group in Canada and over 70% of the jobs are held 
by women. Moreover, there are accentuated sex-based wage differentials — 
a measure of structural inequality in the workplace — with women earning 
58% of the maie salary in 1971 (Lowe, 1980b)10. Outside of the public sec-
tor, however, female clerks are largely unorganized. 
Gender obviously makes a différence in patterns of industrial behav-
iour. Yet research in industrial sociology and industrial relations provides 
few answers to why and how this is the case. Much of this literature is unisex 
in that employées are treated without regard to gender différences (Brown, 
1976:21-22). Few empirical studies of industrial behaviour make référence 
the women, although the resulting théories are assumed to apply equally to 
io This is consistent with the gênerai labour force trend. In 1971 women doing paid work 
in Canada earned about half the average income of men (ARMSTRONG and ARMSTRONG, 
1975:371). This has been remarkably stable over time given that in 1901 female clerks earned 
53% of the average maie salary (LOWE, 1980b). For a description of the pronounced sex-
based wage differentials in banking see BOSSEN (1976). 
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both sexes (Brown, 1976; Acker and Van Houten, 1974; Acker, 1978). This 
maie bias in research has tended to divert attention from problems asso-
ciated with women's work. To quote Feldberg and Glenn (1979:526): 
"When it is studied at ail, women's relationship to employment is treated as 
derivative of personal characteristics and relationships to family situa-
tions." 
The relatively low level of female unionization can be partly accounted 
for, however, by examining the congruence between their social rôles and 
their work rôles. Historically, our society has been patriarchial with men 
tending to occupy positions of authority in ail sphères of activity (Wilensky, 
1968). The sexual division of labour at work is merely an extension of the 
subordinate position of women in the larger society. In the words of Reagan 
and Blaxall (1976:2), "occupational ségrégation of the sexes results from 
the interaction of a well-entrenched and complex set of institutions that per-
pétuâtes the inferior position of women in the labour market, since ail pres-
sures within society, be they familial, légal, économie, cultural, or histori-
cal, tend to reinforce and support occupational ségrégation". 
Clérical work is the major sex-segregated white-collar occupation (see 
Kanter, 1977; Armstrong and Armstrong, 1978). It is thus the idéal case 
study of how patriarchy and sex-segregation combine to inhibit collective 
action. The concentration of women into routine clérical jobs is part of a 
deeply entrenched gender-based occupational stratification system — 
female clerks and maie managers. This structured inequality is reflected in 
terms of differential power, earnings and advancement opportunities. 
Thèse job characteristics create work patterns such as low job commitment 
and high quit rates, which discourage collective action. Moreover, in order 
to unionize, women must overcome the cumulative effects of a socialization 
process which emphasizes passivity. This is especially difficult given that 
patriarchial social relations are daily reinforced and amplified in dealings 
with maie managers. In short, to explain female unionization patterns one 
must address how the worker's position in the productive process, the 
labour market and major social institutions, such as the family, give rise to 
gender-based variations in industrial behaviour. 
The Rôle of Bureaucracy 
Asking why an individual worker joins a union provides only part of 
the answer to the larger question of how collective action émerges. Viewing 
unionization as a social act, we must account for the influence of workplace 
organizational structure on a work group's union propensity. We will focus 
on the degree of bureaucratization, for this is generally considered to be the 
key organizational factor in white-collar unionization (Bain, 1969; 1970; 
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Blum, 1971; Kassalow, 1962; Kleingartner, 1968; Lockwood, 1966; 
Blackburn, 1967; Sturmthal, 1966). Employées are thought to be more like-
ly to unionize if large numbers of them are concentrated under one roof and 
subjected to impersonal rules and standardized working conditions. In-
creased dissatisfaction presumably results as employées feel eut off from 
management (Vogel, 1971:53). This indicates how the rigid authority struc-
ture of the bureaucracy tends to isolate low-ranking employées from active 
participation in décision making. Furthermore, the universalistic reign of 
rules in a bureaucracy facilitâtes the development of collective solutions to 
work problems by treating employées collectively rather than individually 
(Dubin, 1952:234). 
Closer scrutiny, however, reveals that the relationship between bu-
reaucracy and union growth is souaewhat ambiguous. Bain's (1970) model 
of white-collar union growth includes employment concentration — a meas-
ure of bureaucracy — as one of the key variables. Yet the model has been 
challenged largely on the conceptual point that size may not be the charac-
teristic of bureaucracy which most affects unionization. Adams (1977:319), 
for example, asks whether a large firm administered in a non-bureaucratie 
fashion would be more susceptible to unionization than a small bureaucra-
tically administered firm. 
Empirical évidence also undermines the validity of the bureaucracy 
hypothesis. For example, the post-World War I surge of bank unionization 
in Britain has been linked to the increasing bureaucratization of working 
conditions which resulted from bank amalgamations (Blackburn, 1967; 
Lockwood, 1966). Yet the pattern of union growth indicates that the union 
campaign originated in the smaller régional branches, not in the large bu-
reaucratie London branches or head offices (Allen and Williams, 1960). 
The same trend is also found in both U.S. (Coleman and Rose, 1975:40) 
and, as we will see below, Canadian banks. 
Organizations structured along formai bureaucratie lines may thus not 
adhère to strictly bureaucratie principles in their daily administration. Bu-
reaucratie and particularistic administration represent polar extrêmes but 
may indeed coexist within the same organization (see Lockwood, 1966). 
Rather than focusing on employment concentration or overall size, it is 
more fruitful to examine how the rules and régulations of the organization 
are actually administered and, further, whether or not employées perceive 
this to be fair11. 
11 Another aspect of bureaucracy which some analysts consider to be instrumental in of-
fice unionization is the rationalization of the labour process (see CROMPTON, 1979; 
LOCKWOOD, 1966). An obvious example of this would be automation — induced job chan-
ges precipitating unionization. While not denying the importance of rationalization in this re-
spect, and fully recognizing that more research is required (see HERITAGE, 1980), we will not 
consider it hère because of its minimal impact on Canadian bank unionization to date. 
874 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 36. NO 4 (1981) 
One feature of bureaucracy which has been singled out as a strong in-
ducement to unionization is the érosion of promotion prospects. Lack of 
promotion opportunities may undermine the white-collar worker's belief in 
individual merit as the basis for advancement, resulting in a search for alter-
native means of getting ahead (Mills, 1956). But research on this point is far 
from conclusive. On one hand, Sykes (1965) reports that a group of clerks 
ranked promotions above pay, eventually unionizing because their upward 
mobility had been jeopardized by the introduction of a management trainee 
system. In contrast, Bowen and Shaw's (1972) study of clerks at a steel plant 
reveals that under a différent set of circumstances clérical employées con-
sidered employment security more important than promotion and union-
ized because of a gênerai commitment to the ideals of collective bargaining. 
But an even more basic problem with the blocked promotion hypothe-
sis is its dichotomous view of employée job orientation. By differentiating 
principally between employées who aspire to management positions and 
those who do not, it overlooks mobility within the nonsupervisory ranks. 
This is an important point to consider when studying female workers. Re-
search indicates that women hâve weaker career orientations than maies 
(Burnstein et al., 1975:54). Consequently, they may not aspire to manage-
ment positions yet still seek promotion. The concept of blocked mobility, 
then, is of little analytic value without considering a worker's overall job 
orientation. 
Interpersonal Factors 
Every worker is embedded in a network of interpersonal relations 
which influence his or her work attitudes and behaviour. Thèse social rela-
tions can, under certain conditions, facilitate collective action. For exam-
ple, white-collar workers whose jobs bring them into daily contact with 
unionized blue-collar workers are more likely to recognize the advantages of 
unionism (Kleingartner, 1968; Frumhartz, 1963; Kassalow, 1962). In con-
trast, collective impulses may be stifled where relations between employées 
and management are characterized by a high degree of personal interaction. 
This close contact fosters an ideology of individualism which, in turn, is 
usually buttressed by employer paternalism. Social ties outside the work set-
ting are equally important. Unionization may be a more viable option for 
employées from union family backgrounds (Seidman et al., 1951; Karsh, 
1958) or where it is supported by community norms (Bakke, 1956). It is, 
therefore, important for us to briefly consider the impact of workplace 
social relations, family and friendship ties and community context on the 
propensity to unionize. 
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There can be no doubt that industrial relations is partly determined by 
work group structure and norms (Hill and Thurley, 1974:148). Yet little re-
search exists on the formation of work groups and how their internai dyna-
mics may encourage collective action (Hill, 1974:215). The interaction of 
workers on the job provides the basis for a collective définition of the values 
of fairness and equity (Hyman, 1974). As Walker (1966:33) notes, this 
group awareness of power differentials within the organization is a critical 
stage in the development of a "union attitude". 
The work group can influence behaviour more directly by exerting 
pressures on individuals to conform to prevailing norms. Studies of blue-
collar workers (Seidman et al., 1951; Karsh, 1958) and white-collar workers 
(Blackburn, 1967; Brown, 1972) document how under certain circumstances 
workers join unions in order to conform to group pressures. This tendency 
may be more pronounced among new employées who strive to accept estab-
lished norms. In contrast, research on several groups of British white-collar 
workers (Prandy, 1965; Roberts et al., 1972; Bowen and Shaw, 1972) docu-
ment instances where group pressure was not influential in unionization. 
Thèse discrepant findings may be an indication of the way complex occupa-
tional, organizational and technical factors interact within spécifie work-
places, giving rise to différent patterns of industrial behaviour. 
It is also useful to move outside of the workplace and consider the net-
work of family and community ties which the worker brings to his or her 
job. Having unionist parents or living in a community with a solid union 
base is likely to provide socialization expériences which stress the value of 
unionism (see Bowen and Shaw, 1972; Karsh, 1958). This nécessitâtes exam-
ining the effects of socialization on white-collar workers, for they hâve tra-
ditionally been more reluctant to accept unionism than their blue-collar 
counterparts. The moral support offered by unionists among family and 
friends and the climate of opinion in a heavily unionized community legiti-
mizes white-collar organizational efforts, strengthening employée solidarity 
and commitment to unionism. In sum, unionization is a social process best 
comprehended within the context of the worker's social ties on the job and 
within the larger community. 
Management Opposition to Unions 
While the above sociological factors may hâve a positive impact on 
unionization, they are often outweighed by more powerful countervailing 
forces. Among the greatest obstacles to unionization is the degree to which 
management opposes collective représentation for its staff. Bain (1969) 
argues that the lack of union récognition by employers, and little govern-
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ment action to promote such récognition, has inhibited white-collar union 
growth in Canada. Management intransigence in recognizing the employ-
ee's right to bargain collectively constitutes one of the dominant thèmes in 
Canadian labour history (Jamieson, 1971). As Pentland (1979:19) asserts: 
"It is sad but true that Canadian employers as a group — and Canadian 
governments — hâve never taken a forward step in industrial relations by 
intelligent choice, but had to be battered into it ." 
According to Bain (1978:23), there are three main reasons why employ-
er résistance to unions stifles collective action. First, employée identifica-
tion with management could mean that where management disapproves of 
unions employées may be reluctant to join one. Second, the stronger the 
disapproval, the more that employées may feel that union activity will jeop-
ardize their jobs. And third, because most workers join a union for instru-
mental rather than ideological reasons, concrète proof of the benefits of 
unionism are required prior to joining — proof which is only forthcoming 
after the union has been recognized. 
Fear of employer reprisai thus constitutes one of the greatest impedi-
ments to unionization. This is especially true among white-collar workers 
where there is a weak tradition of collective bargaining (Barbash, 1956:15). 
The Canada Labour Code (1972:243) proclaims that "every employée has 
the right to be an active member of a trade union and to participate in the 
activities thereof". But should an employer choose not to recognize a trade 
union, it is very difficult for the members of that union to exercise their 
légal rights. A paternalistic approach to employées often reinforces man-
agement opposition to unions (Crispo, 1978:340). There is no place for 
unions in a philosophy of employée relations which combines an ideology 
of individualism with the paternalistic assumption that management knows 
what is in the best interests of its staff. This is especially true in the banking 
industry, as Bairstow's (1968:55) research indicates. She discovered that 
bank managers stressed individual merit as the central principle in employée 
relations and tended to be more adamant than managers in other industries 
in the belief that unions were unnecessary. 
WHY BANK EMPLOYEES UNIONIZE 
The preceding theoretical discussion has emphasized the importance of 
four factors — employée powerlessness; bureaucratization of the work-
place; employée social relations and community context; and management 
résistance to collective bargaining — in any considération of unionization. 
We will now examine the rôle which thèse factors played in the émergence 
of bank unions. 
CAUSES OF UNIONIZATION IN CANADIAN BANKS 877 
The following account is based on qualitative data obtained through 57 
in-depth interviews with members of bank unions, union organizers and 
bank personnel officiais12. Interviews were recorded and transcribed in full, 
then subjected to content analysis in order to identify the central thèmes and 
issues in the émergence of unionization. Thèse data were supplemented with 
documentary materials from the unions, the banks and the Canada Labour 
Relations Board. We will focus primarily on data from interviews with 37 
members of the CLC's Union of Bank Employées in five Ontario and two 
British Columbia bank branches. Also included in this group were six of the 
original members of the Canadian Union of Bank Employées (CUBE), now 
affiliated with UBE. The choice of branches provided a comparative case 
study approach. This involved maximizing the possible différences between 
branches in Ontario and British Columbia, small towns and large urban 
areas, solid union towns and those with low levels of unionization, and 
three banks — the Canadian Impérial Bank of Commerce, the Bank of 
Montréal and the Bank of Nova Scotia — in terms of the causes and devel-
opmental course of unionization. 
It is useful to provide a socio-demographic profile of the union mem-
bers interviewed for the study. While no point of comparison with non-
union bank employées exists, this profile is nonetheless suggestive of the 
type of employée who joins a bank union. The typical interviewée was a 
woman 32 years of âge with high school éducation and at least four years of 
banking expérience; married to a blue-collar worker and with a family; no 
previous union involvement but with unionists among family and close 
friends; and currently holding an elected position in a bank union. It is 
somewhat difficult to claim that the interviewées were représentative of 
their coworkers in other unionized branches. However, interviews with 
union organizers and bank officiais indicated a fair degree of similarity in 
this respect. 
12 Fourteen union organizers and officiais were interviewed. They represented CUBE, 
the Canadian Chemical Workers' Union (which established CUBE), the Service, Office and 
Retail Workers' Union of Canada (SORWUC), the Retail Clerks International Union, the Of-
fice and Professional Employées International Union, and UBE. This comprised ail major 
unions in banking. Interviews were also conducted with personnel officiais from the Royal 
Bank, Toronto-Dominion, Bank of Montréal and Bank of Nova Scotia. Officiais of the Cana-
dian Impérial Bank of Commerce refused to grant interviews. It should be pointed out that in 
July 1978, in a move unprecedented in récent Canadian labour history, SORWUC withdrew 
from bank organizing. This led to the decertification of 24 locals in B.C. and 2 in 
Saskatchewan of the SORWUC-affiliated United Bank Workers. For an analysis of SORWUC 
see LOWE (1980a:Ch. III) and Bank Book Collective (1979). 
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Employée Powerlessness as the Underlying Cause of Unionization 
The fundamental reason why most employées joined a bank union was 
not because of ideosyncratic factors unique to their job or their branch. 
Rather, underlying the spécifie grievances found in the organizing cam-
paigns was a deeply rooted, generalized dissatisfaction. This feeling arose 
from the powerlessness of employées to affect changes in their working con-
dition. Interviewées occupied routine clérical positions at the bottom of the 
bank hierarchy. They consequently perceived management actions to be 
capricious and arbitrary. Yet employées were unable to do anything about 
it, at least within the constraints of conventional individual bargaining. 
Unionization may, therefore, be interpreted as the employées' response to 
the inequalities and conflict inhérent in their subordinate position within the 
bank's authority structure. 
Perhaps the best expression of employée powerlessness is found in the 
reasons union members gave for joining. For example, a Commerce em-
ployée in Ottawa claimed that "just the feeling of worthlessness", in the 
eyes of management, induced her to join the union. A coworker joined 
because, as she put it, she was "just so tired of them (management) being 
kings". Another Commerce employée described her décision to join in even 
more graphie terms: "I 'm tired of being a pawn, being told what to do and 
when to do it and how to do it by a bunch of incompétent people (i.e.: 
branch management.)". 
Similar sentiments were expressed by Commerce employées in Creston, 
British Columbia. As one teller stated: " I felt so powerless. I wanted some-
one to do the fighting for me and to help. I wanted a say in how rny work is 
going to be run. I just don't want to be pushed around." A senior coworker 
described her décision to support the union in thèse terms: "The reason I 
started in the union was because of the way that people were being treated. 
I've worked for the bank since the 1950's and you put up with a lot of 
things. Finally I just couldn't put up with it any longer." 
Bank of Montréal employées used différent words to draw the same 
conclusions about the main causes of unionization. For example, an experi-
enced clerk in the bank's Bell's Corners branch explained that she joined the 
union because she was "tired of being pushed around by management". 
Again, fair and équitable treatment by management defined the goal which 
employées hoped to achieve through unionization. This was articulated by 
an employée in one of the Windsor branches of the Bank of Montréal: "I 
don't think it's union against management, it's just fair play. You've got to 
hâve something behind you." Corroborating this position, a worker in a 
neighbouring branch complained that "the banks are inclined to treat peo-
ple as second class citizens". 
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Employées in the Simcoe area branches of the Bank of Nova Scotia 
helped launch the current organizational campaign in banking and were 
first to sign a collective agreement with a chartered bank. A dominant 
thème in the interviews with Bank of Nova Scotia employées was a resent-
ment of how décisions made in Toronto head office regulated branch work-
ing conditions. "I believe that in head office they lose touch with small 
places like us", complained one clerk. Communications between thèse 
branches and head office had broken down. Employées thus described 
branch managements dealings with head office officiais as "just like talk-
ing to a wall". 
Problems of isolation from the centres of décision making were also 
voiced by other bank employées in small communities. For example, a teller 
at the Bank of Montreal's Kimberley, British Columbia branch summarized 
the gênerai grievance in the branch in thèse words: "We are under a lot of 
pressure ail the time because we never know from one day to the next if 
Régional Office in Vancouver will phone and say, 'Oh, your volume of bu-
siness says that you only need X number of people; eut three.' So there are 
three people standing there bewildered. They don't know what is going on. 
This way, if you are in a union, you at least hâve some protection." This 
complaint relates to the employées' concerns over automation. Kimberley 
was the only branch studied where technological change was a union issue. 
However, at the root of this grievance was managements lack of communi-
cation and consultation with employées on planned changes. This gave rise 
to rumours about pending staff réduction, creating much job insecurity. 
In each branch a number of more spécifie issues served as catalysts for 
collective action. Thèse catalysts were remarkably similar among the bran-
ches studied and included arbitrary promotion practices, management 
training policies which discriminated against women, lack of overtime pay, 
job pressures because of inadéquate staffing, no coffee breaks, salary poli-
cies and their inéquitable administration and cases of management mistreat-
ment of individual employées. 
It is significant that low wages was not the central grievance, although 
one could reasonably hypothesize that this would be a prime source of dis-
content among poorly paid female clérical employées. Generally, low wages 
were a given in each organizing campaign and employées did not expect im-
médiate improvements because of unionization. Most interviewées agreed 
that their greatest gains through unionization would be increased job securi-
ty and a grievance procédure. Higher wage demands reflected the employ-
ées' désire to achieve a greater measure of control over their working envi-
ronment. The women studied were obviously dissatisfied with the banks' 
low salary scales, but were more concerned with the arbitrary way in which 
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salary décisions were made by management. For example, gênerai cost of 
living increases were often selectively granted to employées. Furthermore, 
the job évaluation Systems used to détermine merit raises operated more on 
the basis of favouritism than on any universal criteria. 
The promotion issue is another manifestation of the problem of power-
lessness. The majority of women in the branches studied did not aspire to 
management positions. A management job was incompatible with the fami-
ly orientation of most employées because of the greater responsibilities, 
time demands and géographie mobility entailed. As a ledgerkeeper explain-
ed: "We enjoy our jobs, we like what we are doing. Maybe we would like to 
go a iittle higher on the clérical scale but as far as getting into management, 
I don't think many of us want it ." Yet employées believed that any women 
who did aspire to a management position should hâve the same opportuni-
ties as men to pursue such a career. What became an issue in the majority of 
organizing campaigns, then, was the discriminatory nature of hiring and 
promotion policies13. Women were continually reminded of their inferior 
status within the organization by the préférence given to young maie univer-
sity graduâtes over experienced female employées in management training 
programs. In the words of one Scotia clerk, "If you're a female, you don't 
hâve a chance." 
Many of thèse complaints coalesced around what may be termed the 
accountant problem. Part of management training involves gaining familia-
rity with a range of banking situations by working for short periods, often 
as an accountant (referred to as administration managers in some banks), in 
a number of branches. The source of the problem was that, despite their ap-
prenticelike status and relatively brief periods of service in any particular 
branch, thèse trainees were responsible for branch personnel matters and 
daily office routine. By giving better paid but inexperienced young men 
authority over lower paid women with considérable seniority and compé-
tence, the banks generated widespread resentment among the latter. In a 
number of branches, the union organizing campaign was sparked by a 
build-up of problems and conflicts with juior maie accountants. Employées 
often perceived the accountant to be incompétent in his job and insensitive 
to human relations factors. The fundamental complaint seemed to be that 
"every new accountant that cornes has a différent set of rules". Thèse dis-
cretionary powers bred insecurity and uncertainty among female employ-
ées, giving rise to a collective définition of what constituted poor manage-
ment practices. 
n It is beyond dispute that female bank employées hâve been discriminated against in ail 
aspects of employment (see BOSSEN, 1976). Indeed, the Royal Bank's Task Force on the 
Status of Women reported in 1977 that the bank's policies and practices, while formally non-
discriminatory, were de facto discriminatory. Banks are now attempting to implement pro-
grams designed to improve the position of women by increasing the scope and availability of 
advancement opportunities. 
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Female clerks hâve typically dealt with major work problems by quit-
ting. Unionization thus entailed a major shift in their job orientation. This 
émergent union attitude was summarized by a Windsor clerk in thèse terms: 
"If you aren't happy and you sit back, then you deserve the treatment you 
are getting if you don't fight for what you believe in. You hâve to stand up 
and say, 'No, I want better!' You hâve to or else you are not going to get 
it." In sum, the subordinate. position of the women within the bank hierar-
chy created the condition of powerlessness, leading to the collective percep-
tion that the central work problem was arbitrary and unfair management 
décision making. When reinforced by concrète examples of management in-
compétence or callousness, unionization became a real alternative. 
The Impact of Bureaucracy on the Propensity to Unionize 
One might reasonably expect powerlessness to be most acute among 
employées in lower levels of large, impersonal bureaucracies. However, 
bank unionization in Canada originated in settings where most of thèse con-
ditions were minimal or absent. Union locals are principally confined to 
small branch units, where the average employée-manager ratio is about 12:1 
and daily administration is more particularistic than bureaucratie. In fact, 
most branches average less than twenty employées with many having as few 
as five (Ponak and Moore, 1980). In contrast, the large head offices and 
régional data centres, which more closely approximate the bureaucratie 
model of administration, hâve not been the focal points of union activity. 
As large-scale organizations, banks are structured along formai bu-
reaucratie lines. Rules, régulations, functional departments and a direct 
chain of command are ail designed to ensure organizational effectiveness. 
However, a very différent picture émerges once one steps outside the central 
offices and data centres into one of the thousands of small, dispersed 
branch units. It is hère that particularistic administration prédominâtes. 
This suggests that bank administration combines both bureaucratie and the 
particularistic éléments within an overall bureaucratie structure. Employée 
complaints about poor management stemmed from the inability of head of-
fice to control the activities of managerial personnel geographically distant 
from the locus of power. Despite highly centralized controls to ensure uni-
formity in administration, top officiais were unable to continually monitor 
the quality of management throughout the branch network. While the bran-
ches are an intégral part of the bureaucratie bank structure, they taxed the 
ability of that structure to maintain fully standardized rules, régulations 
and working conditions. Ironically, employées reacted to particularistic 
branch administration by turning to unionization as a means of achieving a 
greater degree of bureaucracy. In short, employées believed that the rules 
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and régulations contained in a collective agreement were necessary to coun-
terbalance the arbitrariness and uncertainty which defined branch employée 
relations. 
Much of what happened in the branches leading up to and during 
unionization can thus be interpreted as a direct resuit of the problems of a 
large bureaucracy. This was amply documented in the interviews. Returning 
to the accountant problem, we can see how the formai, universalistic rules 
of the bureaucracy gave way to particularistic administration due to the ac-
countants' extensive discretionary powers. The présent bank unionization 
drive originated in the Simcoe, Ontario branch of the Commerce largely as 
a response to the actions of a new accountant. This accountant was de-
scribed by interviewées as authoritarian and incompétent. The catalysts for 
union organization were provided when he promoted an employée on the 
basis of administrative expediency, rather than merit, and mistreated an-
other employée in an open display of favouritism. 
Employées at the Bank of Montreal's Bell's Corners branch resented 
their dependence on the administration manager (accountant) for décent 
working conditions. One teller elaborated: "If they (administration man-
agers) liked you, you got ahead; if they didn't, that was tough, you stayed 
where you were." But the grievances went deeper than not being able to ob-
tain promotions. Another employée gave a more gênerai perspective on the 
problem: "He (the administration manager) can corne in and do anything 
he wants to, from changing your hours, to telling you when you can go to 
lunch, to changing what job you do. He can do anything he wants and 
we've had a particularly terrible one." Similarly, employées at the bank's 
main Windsor branch described how they were "pushed" into the union by 
the actions of the administration manager. Tellers complained that recog-
nized compétence was a liability, for the administration manager would 
then want to "keep them on cash" rather than rewarding their good per-
formance with a promotion. Finally, employées at a British Columbia 
branch described how the new branch accountant announced upon arrivai 
that he personally did not believe in giving high compétent ratings (i.e.: the 
top job performance évaluation) to employées. The women wanted fair 
rewards for their efforts. They consequently looked to the union to ensure 
that job évaluations and promotions were based solely on merit and sen-
iority. 
Branch managers are generally less involved in the personnel function 
than accountants. However, in a number of instances their actions rein-
forced the particularistic approach to employée relations. Given the diffi-
culty of standardizing personnel practices in the branches, it is possible for 
the personality of individual managers to overshadow centrally formulated 
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rules. This gives rise to an ad hoc style of administration, as was certainly 
the case in the Commerce branch in Creston, British Columbia. Taking a 
more direct rôle in daily branch routine, the manager treated employées in 
what they described as a "mean and ruthless" fashion. Because job security 
and rewards seemed to dépend on the personal whim of the manager, em-
ployées turned to a union as a means of curbing his power. We should also 
note that in many cases branch managements response to unionization fol-
lowed the same ad hoc pattern, with the manager's personal discrétion over-
riding the directives from head office. 
Social Relations and Unionization 
Certain sociologiçal factors facilitated the émergence of union locals. 
Most important were the nature of social relations found within the work 
group and the degree to which unionism was legitimized and supported by a 
worker's community ties. Work groups are of interest because their level of 
cohesiveness bears directly on the potential for collective action. Further-
more, it is within the work group that the grass-roots leadership so crucial 
for a successful organizing campaign émerges. Family and friends are in-
strumental in socializing the employée to the value of unionism and pro-
viding personal support during organizational campaigns. The community 
context is important in two respects. First, the more closely integrated social 
relations found in smaller communities may augment work group solida-
rity. Second, in heavily unionized communities public opinion is much more 
accepting of new unionization drives. Ail of thèse factors are especially cru-
cial in banking given concerted management opposition to unions. 
Interviewées typically described their work groups as friendly and 
cohesive. Indeed, working in a congenial team atmosphère was seen by most 
as a positive aspect of bank employment. While thèse on-the-job friend-
ships did not involve much socializing after working hours, they served the 
important function of facilitating discussions of work problems. Camara-
derie among employées tended to increase the longer they had worked to-
gether. Recalling that the average seniority of the interviewées was four 
years, it is understandable why a feeling of commitment to both one's job 
and one's coworkers would develop. As one clerk elaborated: "Ours was an 
old branch, in that people had been there, at least (at the time of unioniza-
tion) four or more years. They knew the work. Rather than if you get a 
branch with just new people, a lot of the feeling is Tm not going to work 
hère very long, I'm not interested (in a union)."' In a few cases this group 
solidarity exerted subtle pressures to conform on those employées who may 
hâve been ambivalent or apathetic toward the union. Similarly, work group 
cohesiveness led several elderly or part-time employées to support the union 
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not for personal gain but, as one such employée put it, "for the gais that are 
working hère full-time." 
It would be inaccurate to assume that ail branches in which union activ-
ity emerged were closely-knit, harmonious social units. In some branches 
strong internai leaders initiated the unionization campaign, but personal 
frictions and inter-group rivalries within the branch were manipulated by 
management to ultimately defeat the union. This is true of the two Com-
merce branches where the présent union campaign originated. Thèse bran-
ches became divided into pro- and anti-union cliques, with the latter receiv-
ing managements tacit support. Standing in contrast were those branches 
where friendships and group relations transcended union-management 
Unes. This was found in the Simcoe area Bank of Nova Scotia branches and 
some of the Windsor Bank of Montréal branches. The fact that unioniza-
tion did not drive a wedge between union members and managerial person-
nel in thèse branches suggests that employées can hold a 'dual allegiance', 
simultaneously exhibiting a commitment to change through the union and 
an allegiance to management14. In the words of one teller, "Just because 
you want the union doesn't mean you don't care for the bank, or don't like 
what you are doing." 
Interpersonal relations may also facilitate unionization through good 
inter-branch communications. Unionizing Bank of Nova Scotia employées 
in the Simcoe area benefited from the close personal ties found in smaller 
communities. Information regarding the union was freely exchanged among 
the branches. The same phenomenon was évident in Windsor, but for dif-
férent reasons. What distinguished Windsor from other areas of union ac-
tivity was the Bank of Montreal's 'Girl's Club'. For about twenty years, the 
bank has sponsored dinner and discussion evenings for female employées in 
its Windsor branches. Interviewées invariably mentioned how the club 
helped the union organizational campaign quickly spread from one to nine 
branches by providing an active inter-branch communication network. 
Leadership is another aspect of work group dynamics contributing to 
successful unionization campaigns. A strong leader is instrumental in cre-
ating and maintaining the level of solidarity required to sustain the momen-
tum of an organizing drive. This is especially crucial in view of the banks' 
u Employée identification with management constitutes a potential déterrent to unioni-
zation given that it represents a form of anticipatory socialization for those employées aspiring 
to higher positions. Yet Mills (1956:305) argues that it may signify nothing more than a cover-
up for fear of reprisai. Furthermore, the dual loyalty thesis indicates that a commitment to 
management may not preclude allegiance to a union (DEAN, 1954). For example, a group of 
technicians simultaneously pursued individual goals of promotion, strongly identifying with 
management, while protecting their collective market position through membership in a union 
(ROBERTS et al., 1972). 
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opposition to unions. Many dissatisfied employées, feeling insecure in their 
jobs and unsure of their légal rights, will wait for someone else to initiate 
change. Evidence from interviews indicates that none of the key union ac-
tivist had less than five years seniority in banking. Thèse women tended to 
be recognized by coworkers as work group leaders and were perceived as 
having "no axe to grind'\ They were often highly respected by manage-
ment, thereby lending credibility to the alternative they were presenting. A 
few of the leaders were single women with strong career aspirations. Others 
came from within the ranks of the tellers, where the close employée interac-
tion and job pressures readily spwaned activist leadership. 
We noted in our socio-demographic profile of interviewées that the ma-
jority had husbands or friends who belonged to unions. Thèse social rela-
tions were décisive in successful campaigns, acquainting bank employées 
with the advantages of collective bargaining and furnishing legitimacy and 
support to their actions. Many of the leaders in unionized branches had this 
type of union background. For example, the Canadian Union of Bank Em-
ployées grew out of meetings with the Canadian Chemical Workers Union 
arranged by a Commerce employée whose husband was a CCWU steward. 
In Creston, British Columbia, Ottawa, and Windsor contact was made with 
the UBE through unionist spouses or friends. Not ail unionist husbands ap-
proved of their wives also becoming union members. Nonetheless, the ma-
jority of women claimed that their husband, family and close friends were 
supportive of their union activity. 
The UBE's success in Windsor, where it has achieved certification in 
nine of the city's thirteen Bank of Montréal branches, best exemplifies how 
community characteristics influence unionization. Windsor is the Canadian 
stronghold of the United Auto Workers and public opinion in the city is 
decidedly pro-union. In the words of one Windsor clerk: "Well, like I said, 
right from the beginning I would hâve joined... if they had said, 'here's the 
card, it's for the union, sign it', I would hâve because that's how I was 
brought up. If my Dad had a problem at Chrysler, he would go to the 
union. If my husband had a problem at work he would go to the (union). It 
gives you a middle man that can help you solve your problems, whereas 
when I hâve a problem at work I go right to the administration manager, 
which isn't going to get me anywhere because he doesn't care for me to 
begin with." This was a typical response to the question of whether being in 
a union town influenced the employee's décision to join a bank union. 
Management Opposition to Unions 
Bank employées faced many obstacles in attempting to establish a col-
lective bargaining relationship with management. In a few branches the 
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union received overwhelming employée support right from the start. But 
usually there was a sizeable minority of employées scared to hâve anything 
to do with the union for fear of management reprisais. Whether real or im-
agined, this fear presently constitutes the greatest barrier to union growth in 
the banking industry. Much of the fear employées experienced cari be ex-
plained in terms of the degree to which they hâve internalized management 
ideology. The banks varied in their response to unionization. The Com-
merce's défensive anti-unionism stands in marked contrast to the more of-
fensive strategy of improving working conditions and employée relations 
adopted by the other major banks. But whatever the approach, just know-
ing that management preferred not to deal with unions was sufficient to cre-
ate confusion and uncertainty among employées during organizational cam-
paigns. 
Bank personnel officiais interviewed for this study espoused a human 
relations philosophy. They argued that the core of the managerial function 
is the fair, équitable and honest treatment of staff. The essence of the 
banks' view of unions is simply that employées treated in this way will not 
need the assistance of a third party. Yet in each organizing campaign there 
were instances of management interférence with the employées' right to 
unionize. Fear of reprisai was thus continually reinforced. Through staff 
meetings, circulars, individual discussion with management, visits from 
head office personnel officiais, attempts to spy on union meetings or trans-
ferring union supporters out of the branch, it was made abundantly clear 
that employées who joined a union did so against the wishes of man-
agement15. 
The concerted anti-union practices of the Commerce set it apart from 
the other banks. And as union organizers readily pointed out, the Com-
merce's response to unions provides solid évidence of the ineffectiveness of 
existing législation in redressing the damaging effect of employer opposition 
on organizational campaigns. It is significant that while the current union 
drive originated in two Commerce branches, the unions involved failed to 
achieve certification largely because of managements counter-attack (see 
Lowe, 1980a; Bank Book Collective, 1979). A clerk in the bank's Simcoe 
branch described how the fear engendered by management intimidation 
15 One of the most common tactics in the early period of unionization was to transfer 
pro-management employées into a branch at the first sign of union activity. However, the 
négative impact of this practice on the level of union support was virtually eliminated with the 
introduction of the Bill C-8 amendments to the Canada Labour Code in July 1978. The Board 
was allowed to use the date of application for certification as the terminal date for deciding the 
level of support for the union. Union organizers interviewed for this study saw Bill C-8 as a tur-
ning point in the union campaign. 
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paralyzed the union campaign: "In the bank the word union just got to be a 
dirty word. The girls were just petrified... they don't even want to think 
aboutit." 
The tone of the bank's strategy is clearly outlined in a manual entitled 
"Management Guide on Union Organizing" (see Canada Labour Relations 
Board, 1979d) distributed to ail branch managers in 1977. Managers were 
advised how to detect and respond to signs of union activity and provided 
with a list of questions and answers on unions to communicate to employ-
ées. The manual was withdrawn from circulation after becoming a source of 
controversy during unfair labour practice hearings. Nonetheless, the anti-
union messages which it contained set the pattern for future actions16. 
Détails of a number of unfair labour practice convictions against the 
Commerce (see Canada Labour Relations Board, 1979a, 1979b, 1979c) do-
cument how far management is willing to go in order to thwart unions. In 
one case, the UBW charged that the bank's circular announcing a 9% wage 
increase on January 1, 1979 contravened the Canada Labour Code because 
it excluded employées in branches where union certification was pending or 
had been granted17. The Board concurred, noting that the circular could on-
ly hâve been designed to undermine union support and warn potential mem-
bers of the négative conséquences of unionization. Reviewing the behaviour 
of the Commerce throughout the unionization drive, the Board concluded 
that a concerted campaign against unions had been directed from head of-
fice. The Board (1979a:20) cited as évidence a January 1978 mémorandum 
from the président of the bank to ail departmental managers: "To the fui-
lest extent possible, the Bank will préserve its right to deal with, and com-
municate with, its employées directly and not through a thirdparty... The 
Bank will not be coerced and will resist the inefficient fragmentation ofthe 
branch network which has grown and developed through the dedicated ef-
forts of many personnel over a number of years.*' (Emphasis added by 
16 A section in the guide, entitled "Should I Join the Union", begins by stating "the 
freedom of choice is yours. Carefully consider ail sides of the question." Yet the information 
which foliows contains thèse anti-union messages: a union imposes restrictions on employée 
dealings with management; work relation become highly formalized; outsiders will negotiate 
ail conditions of employment; unions are not very démocratie; individual members hâve little 
opportunity to influence union policies; "controversy and picketing" are a standard feature of 
collective bargaining; unions often tell potential members that they will lose their jobs unless 
they join; union leaders are the one to décide when to strike; dues are substantial; layoffs are 
common in unionized industries; union agreements normally require rigid hours of work; and, 
finally, bank unions emerged fifty years ago in Europe under conditions entirely différent than 
those found today. 
n The Commerce, the Royal Bank and the Bank of Montréal were ail named in UBE's 
initial complaint to the CLRB. By agreement of the parties, the Board heard the complaints 
against the Commerce and the other two banks agreed to abide by the Board's décision. 
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CLRB). Thus, under "the guise of defending individual rights", the Com-
merce unilaterally "deprived its employées of access to an effective dispute 
resolution mechanism" (Canada Labour Relations Board, 1979a:21). 
CONCLUSION 
Let us return to the three questions raised at the beginning of the paper. 
In order to better understand the process of unionization, we asked: Why 
do workers join unions? What conditions facilitate the transition from in-
dividual bargaining with management to collective action through unioniza-
tion? And, finally, what factors inhibit unionization? A dominant thème 
running throughout the paper has been the social nature of the unionization 
process. In an attempt to understand this process we focused on four con-
textual variables: the degree of employée powerlessness; the type of organi-
zational structure and the nature of administrative practices; the worker's 
social relations on the job and in the larger community; and the degree to 
which management opposes unions. Using this perspective, we then exam-
ined the three research questions above as they pertain to bank unioni-
zation. 
We suggested that bank unionization is a response to the basic condi-
tion of powerlessness. Bank union members are female workers at the bot-
tom of the bank hierarchy. What they share in common is a désire to exer-
cise greater control over their working conditions and protection from arbi-
trary management actions. Ail employées in non-supervisory bank positions 
face thèse problems. Why then, has only a small fraction adopted unioniza-
tion as a solution? To answer this, more comparative évidence is required 
on the différences between union and non-union employées. In order to 
know why some employées unionize, it is useful to know why others in simi-
lar jobs do not. 
We can, however, offer some tentative hypothèses as to what accounts 
for the émergence of bank unionism. Common to ail the branches studied 
were complaints about poor management. This indicates a basic contradic-
tion in bank organization: a formai bureaucratie structure with centralized 
décision making, yet with particularistic administrative practices in the dis-
persée! operating units. This is not to say that a healthy dose of good man-
agement would eliminate the need for unions. The structural problems we 
hâve identified are embedded in the very nature of the branch banking Sys-
tem. It is, therefore, unlikely that more human relations in personnel prac-
tices would significantly diminish the root cause of unionization. 
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Assuming that sufficient catalysts are présent in a branch to heighten 
the employées' collective awareness of their powerlessness, the union alter-
native is more likely to be considered should certain situational factors be 
présent. For example, the branches in which union locals are developed 
tended to hâve high levels of work group cohesiveness. Employées seemed 
committed to bank work, having relatively high seniority for an industry 
plagued by rapid staff turnover. Furthermore, an organizational campaign 
is more likely to émerge, and succeed, in a branch located in a union com-
munity. Bank employées would thus hâve had positive exposure to unions 
through family and friends. Finally, a leader had to émerge within the 
branch, taking the initiative to contact the union and set up meetings. At 
this point, the availability of a union was an important prerequisite. Also 
critical was the degree to which management opposed unions. Indeed, the 
climate of fear which management résistance engenders among staff can 
cripple an organizing campaign. Fear of management reprisai thus consti-
tues the greatest obstacle to the development of bank unionization. 
Because of the preliminary nature of the présent study, it invariably 
raises more questions than it answers. Four questions stand out as particu-
larly fruitful lines of inquiry: First, precisely how do workers' social rela-
tions on the job and in the community facilitate collective action? Second, 
we hâve argued that certain features of bureaucracy help precipitate unioni-
zation. Given that employées are largely reacting to the arbitrariness of 
management décision making by demanding more équitable rules, to what 
extent will unionization contribute to the formai bureaucratization of 
branch working conditions? The key issue remains, of course, who controls 
the rules of the bureaucracy. Third, looking at obstacles to unionization, 
how does management foster an employée ideology of individualism to 
counter collectivist tendencies? Given the banking industry's predominantly 
female work force, it is necessary to détermine how management reinforces 
the patriarchial nature of social relations, thereby increasing employée 
dependence and submissiveness. Finally, it is essential to monitor the devel-
opment of bank unions over time. Only then will we be able to explain how 
the particular circumstances giving rise to a union shapes its future growth 
pattern. Each of thèse questions requires investigation before the complète 
story of why Canadian bank employées are unionizing can be told. 
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Les causes de la syndicalisation 
dans les banques canadiennes 
Le développement du syndicalisme dans les banques du Canada est d'origine 
récente. Depuis 1976, les syndicats ont réussi à implanter des sections locales dans 76 
succursales bancaires prenant ainsi pied dans ce secteur d'activité économique. Le 
bas niveau de syndicalisation dans les banques, si l'on y ajoute que la main-d'oeuvre 
est en grande partie formée de femmes, en fait un des événements les plus significa-
tifs sur la scène des relations professionnelles au Canada au cours des dernières 
années. 
Le processus de syndicalisation est envisagé sous quatre aspects différents: le 
degré d'impuissance des employés, la structure des banques et leurs pratiques admi-
nistratives, les relations sociales tant sur les lieux du travail que dans la collectivité et 
le poids de l'opposition de la direction à la négociation collective. 
C'est dans cette perspective que sont étudiées les causes de la syndicalisation 
dans les banques. En se fondant sur un grand nombre de documents de même que 
sur de longues entrevues auprès de 37 membres du Syndicat des employés de banque 
affilié au Congrès du travail du Canada et d'une vingtaine de recruteurs syndicaux 
ainsi que de directeurs du personnel, on arrive à la conclusion que c'est l'impuissance 
des employés à contrecarrer les décisions arbitraires de la direction qui est à la source 
de la campagne de syndicalisation. Les catalyseurs spécifiques, qui peuvent aller du 
renvoi d'un camarade de travail à l'absence de pause-café, aident les employés à don-
ner une valeur collective à un mécontentement généralisé. Il est révélateur que ni les 
bas salaires ni la rareté des chances d'avancement ne soient les griefs principaux mis 
de l'avant dans les campagnes de recrutement. 
D'ailleurs, que les candidats potentiels à la syndicalisation soient des employés 
de bureau occupant des postes subordonnés au bas de la hiérarchie est de nature à 
aggraver encore cette condition d'impuissance. 
D'autre part, les plaintes des employés au sujet de ce qu'ils appellent une «direc-
tion déficiente» peuvent se rattacher aux problèmes de structure de l'aménagement 
du système à succursales des banques. On estime que, même si les banques possèdent 
des structures bureaucratiques, des pratiques administratives diverses tendent à pré-
valoir dans le réseau de petites unités de fonctionnement, ce qui indique la difficulté 
de contrôler la qualité de la direction au niveau de la succursale. 
Aussi, les employés sont-ils enclins à se tourner vers le syndicalisme lorsque cer-
tains facteurs favorables se présentent tels un fort esprit de groupe, un certain 
«leadership» interne, la connaissance des avantages du syndicalisme grâce aux rela-
tions familiales ou communautaires. D'un autre côté, le plus grand obstacle à la 
croissance du syndicalisme parmi les employés de banque réside dans l'opposition 
des dirigeants à la négociation collective, principalement à cause de la crainte de 
représailles qu'ils suscitent parmi le personnel. 
